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Thomas F. Huertas
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Today we are in the midst of a financial crisis.  That crisis may lead to a severe 
recession. 
 
Two questions confront us all.  How do we contain this crisis, and how do we cure the 
system, so that crises will not recur in the future? 
 
Containment must be our first priority.  We must arrest the downward spiral in 
finance in order to avoid the devastation of the real economy that would be caused, if 
the financial system ceased to function effectively.   
We are the midst of a vicious cycle
Market
liquidity
Capital
Asset 
quality
Real economy
Funding 
liquidity
 
Today we are caught in a vicious circle.  Asset values have been declining for well 
over a year.  Market liquidity is evaporating.  Bid-ask spreads are widening, and for 
many complex assets there are no bids at all.  The decline in asset values has imposed 
losses on firms and shrunk banks’ capital.  That in turn has raised concerns about the 
credit-worthiness of the banks.  This in turn has created pressures on funding 
liquidity.  To conserve cash banks are cutting back on credit availability and this is 
adversely affecting the real economy.  The world now faces the prospect of a severe 
recession. 
 
                                                 
* The author is Director, Banking Sector, Financial Services Authority (UK).  This paper is based on an 
address given before the Institute of Law and Finance, University of Frankfurt on 1 December 2008.   - 2 - 
Failures of financial institutions, and the manner in which those failures were dealt 
with, further aggravated the situation.  In particular, the failure of Lehman Brothers in 
September reversed expectations created by the earlier rescue of Bear Stearns that 
large broker dealers would not be allowed to fail.  Moreover, the failure of Lehman 
Brothers brought home to all that global institutions may be global as going concerns 
but they become a series of local legal entities when they become subject to 
administration and/or liquidation.  The failure of Lehmans caused market participants 
to review quickly  their securities lending arrangements, limit rehypothecation and 
reallocate free cash balances.  That had very significant knock-on effects on other 
broker dealers.   
 
The failure of Washington Mutual, also in September, compounded these effects.  The 
US a uthorities failed to keep whole the senior debt holders in the bank.  This 
contrasted markedly with their behaviour in resolving other bank failures.  This 
change in resolution practice caused market participants to revise their estimates of 
risk in senior, unsecured obligations of banks, further aggravating the funding 
squeeze. 
 
Other bank failures compounded the problem, including Bradford and Bingley here in 
the UK, Fortis in Belgium/Netherlands, HRE in Germany, and the collapse of much 
of the Icelandic banking system.  So did the extended debate in the United States 
about whether and how to enact the $700 billion TARP programme as well as the 
growing realisation that, even it were enacted, it would take time to implement.   
 
To combat this crisis, authorities are taking steps to assure that banks are sound, so 
that they can continue to fulfil their prime function of intermediating credit – taking 
deposits and making loans.  That entails assuring that banks have adequate capital and 
adequate liquidity as well as designing programmes to extract the toxic assets from 
banks’ balance sheets. 
 
Against this backdrop of deepening crisis, the UK Tripartite Authorities announced on 
8 October that they would implement a comprehensive £500 billion plan to support 
the  UK banking system.  The plan addressed both capital and funding liquidity 
together, not one in isolation from the other.  The plan: 
  
•  Doubled the size of the B ank of England's Special Liquidity Scheme to 
£200 billion; 
 
•  Instituted a guarantee programme  (the Credit Guarantee Scheme)  of 
approximately £250 billion for new wholesale debt issuance by banks that 
either already have or have a plan for raising Tier 1 capital in the amount and 
in the form the Government considers appropriate; 
 
•  Indicated that the Government had allocated £50 billion to act, if need be, 
as an underwriter or capital provider of last resort (the Bank Recapitalisation 
Fund) to enable banks to meet the capital standard required for participation in 
the Credit Guarantee Scheme.   For institutions that availed themselves of the 
Government's offer to subscribe to new capital, the Government imposed 
additional institution-specific conditions relating to dividends, executive   - 3 - 
compensation, board representation, management and strategy (including 
commitments with respect to lending to individuals and SMEs in the UK). 
 
The combination of higher capital and credit guarantees is designed to limit the risks 
to the taxpayer. 
 
The prompt translation of the plan into action initially had a calming effect o n 
markets, particularly since other countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and the United States quickly followed with the implementation of 
similar measures.  All in all, governments around the world have pledged well over €5 
trillion in credit guarantees and capital injections for the world’s major banks. 
 
Initially, these actions appeared to stabilise the situation.  CDS spreads narrowed, 
LIBOR rates dropped, and liquidity began to return. 
 
UK Banks 5yr Euro CDS Spreads
Credit Markets
Credit default swap (CDS) spreads
illustrate the cost per annum for protection 
against a default by the company. A wider 
spread indicates a market perception of 
greater risk of default. 
Source: Bloomberg
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Then,  the United States reversed course.  Initially, the Troubled Asset Relief 
Programme (TARP) envisioned that the Treasury would buy troubled or toxic assets 
directly from the banks.  Then, in mid November the Treasury announced that it no 
longer intended to d o so.  This caused a dramatic further decline in the prices of 
troubled assets, leading to further losses and to pressures on banks, such as Citigroup, 
that had significant amounts of such assets.  On 23 November the US authorities 
announced that they has put in place a further recapitalisation of Citigroup along with 
an arrangement to guarantee over $300 billion of Citigroup’s assets in exchange for 
further warrants on Citigroup common stock as well as restrictions on Citigroup’s 
paying dividends and bonuses to senior executives.  This structure paralleled an 
earlier transaction that the Swiss National Bank had conducted with UBS. 
 
In addition to the measures taken to stabilise individual banks, central banks  have 
taken supplemental measures to improve liquidity through direct asset purchase 
programmes as well as through expanding the range of eligible collateral.  In the   - 4 - 
United States the Federal Reserve has purchased directly maturing commercial paper 
as well as Fannie Mac and Freddie Mac mortgage securities.  In the UK the Bank of 
England has revised its Red Book to expand the range of eligible collateral and to 
reduce the pricing for its Standing Facilities.   
 
Central banks and governments are supplementing these institution and market 
specific measures with massive macroeconomic stimulus.  Central banks have slashed 
interest rates.  The Federal Reserve has reduced the Fed funds rate to 1%.  The Bank 
of England reduced its base rate by 150 basis points to 3% and reduced it again on 4 
December to 2%.  The ECB has reduced rates once and did so again on 4 December.  
Governments have announced massive fiscal stimulus packages combining tax cuts 
and spending increases. 
   
Even as we grapple with the problem of how to contain the current crisis, attention is 
turning to the question of how we can prevent the system from again going awry.  The 
expanded G - 20 has met in Washington and delivered a comprehensive set of 
recommendations.  The EU has established a Committee of Wise Men under the 
chairmanship of Jacques de Larosiere to consider appropriate reforms to the EU 
structures. 
 
These summit initiatives come on top of legislative and regulatory proposals that are 
already under consideration at national and EU level.  This evening’s speech is not the 
time to go into great detail, but a few elements are perhaps worth bearing in mind as 
these discussions intensify. 
Asset price bubble in action
Market
liquidity
Capital
Asset 
quality
Real economy
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liquidity
 
First and foremost, our attention must be on the measures that can moderate the cycle 
that runs in good times from increasing asset prices to greater market liquidity to 
higher profits and higher capital, to greater funding liquidity and to increased real 
economic activity.  Essentially we are talking about measures that will prevent asset 
price bubbles from forming in the first place. 
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And that will be difficult, not least because people are generally delighted as an asset 
bubble inflates.  Rising house prices, rising stock prices and rising bond prices are all 
perceived to the good things.  And so they are, provided they do not rise too rapidly 
and sow the seeds of a crash to come. 
 
Let me start with  measures that pertain to asset prices and market liquidity.  The 
current crisis has its origins in the evaporation of market liquidity in complex, 
difficult-to-value assets, so-called Level 3 assets, which are subject to “independent 
price verification”.  Recently, the IASB has changed its rules so that firms reporting 
under IFRS can shift such assets from the trading book to the banking book, if they 
intend to hold the assets to maturity.  This brings IFRS into conformity with US 
GAAP and should facilitate resolution of the crisis. 
 
But this accounting change only addresses the symptoms of the problem.  The more 
fundamental issue is the investment banking business model.  Is this sustainable?  
Should it be preserved? 
 
The investment banking model is frequently described as “originate to distribute”.  It 
was anything but.  The most significant problems over the past year have been 
associated with banks that originated but did not distribute.  For example, some banks 
thought that it paid to keep vast quantities of super senior tranches of securitisation 
deals on their own books  – quantities that amounted to several decades of daily 
trading volume in such securities.  Those sure-fire super senior tranches become the 
financial equivalent of hula hoops piled up in the warehouse of a defunct retailer.  
Other banks thought it was wise to warehouse extensive amounts of mortgages, 
pending securitisation, so that they could save on underwriting f ees.  Such banks 
effectively took massive amounts of liquidity risk.  They simply did not distribute 
quickly enough.  Effectively, these banks were taking inventory risk – and they either 
ran out of funding or they found that investors did not share their assumptions about 
the value of the merchandise that they had elected to stockpile. 
 
Other banks thought is made sense to arbitrage risks – to invest in complex illiquid 
securities through conduits or structured investment vehicles that they created and 
managed and to whom they supplied explicit or implicit liquidity support.  This 
liquidity support enabled the conduits and SIVs to fund themselves in the commercial 
paper market until such time as the prices of the complex illiquid securities began to 
crumble.  Then the banks had to take a good portion of the assets back onto their 
balance sheets and to bear the losses.  So the distribution that banks made to conduits 
and SIVs was the worst kind of distribution – reversible distribution. 
 
To prevent such excesses from happening again,  three  measures are under 
consideration.  The first is a requirement to force banks to consolidate conduits, SIVs 
and other so-called off-balance sheet vehicles into their reported accounts and to keep 
capital and liquidity against the risk that such vehicles create.  The second  is to 
introduce dynamic provisioning.  Spain has used this effectively to require its banks to 
build up loan loss reserves in good times so that they could be drawn upon when the 
economy turned down.  
The third, and most controversial measure, is to impose a leverage restriction on 
banks in addition to the risk-based capital requirement imposed under Basel 2.  
Proponents frequently note that the US has employed a leverage ratio for a number of   - 6 - 
years.  However, the leverage ratio employed in the US did not prevent firms from 
suffering very large losses on large concentrations of sub-prime assets.  Nor did the 
leverage ratio prevent firms from sponsoring SIVs and conduits  – vehicles that 
ultimately contributed to severe liquidity pressures.  Nor did the leverage ratio prevent 
problems from arising at Citigroup, Wachovia or Washington Mutual.  So if we are to 
adopt a leverage ratio as a countercyclical device, we should certainly not adopt the 
US version as is. 
 
In designing and implementing any type of leverage ratio, we will confront two 
boundary problems: which activities within a group should be subject to the ratio, and 
which firms should be subject to the ratio.  The Swiss, for example, are suggesting 
that the domestic Swiss retail banking activities should be exempt from the ratio, 
whilst the international, investment banking activities of the group should be subject 
to the ratio.  Experience has shown, however, that firms are quite adroit at arbitraging 
differences in requirements across different books within the same group.  Indeed, 
some of the current crisis can, in my view, be traced to firms’ placing assets that did 
not trade and were not liquid, such as super senior tranches of CDOs, into trading 
books, so as to benefit from lower initial capital requirements.  So, if leverage ratios 
are to be employed, consideration should be given to applying them to the group as a 
whole. 
 
The second boundary problem is more difficult.  How do we decide which entities 
should be subject to the leverage ratio?   Should this be restricted to entities that take 
retail deposits on the theory that society provides a safety net in the form of deposit 
insurance to protect the depositor?  Or should the leverage ratio apply to any firm or 
group that would have access to liquidity facilities from the central bank?  Or should 
the leverage ratio apply to any entity, including hedge funds and possibly non-
financial corporations, whose failure could disrupt financial markets?    
 
Subjecting one type of firm to leverage ratios whilst others are exempt is an open 
invitation for business during the boom to flow to the unconstrained sector.  Indeed, 
one could imagine that stringent leverage ratios on financial intermediaries could 
further promote direct capital markets issuance by frequent issuers.  If business does 
flow out of the constrained sector, will the constrained sector have the opportunity to 
build up the capital and reserves necessary to be able to provide credit to the economy 
as the boom turns to bust, and margins increase?   For leverage ratios to be effective 
as a means of tempering macroeconomic booms and busts, will it be necessary to 
impose such ratios not just on the intermediaries, but on borrowers themselves?  Or is 
the wiser course of action simply to drop consideration of the leverage ratio? 
    
Capital is the next element of the cycle, and this will certainly get extensive attention 
from regulators and policymakers.  There will be a review of capital requirements by 
the Basel Committee and in the EU, particularly with respect to requirements for the 
trading book.  The broad assumption underlying the Basel Capital Accord – that 
regulators around the world could rely on firms' own risk models as the basis for 
capital requirements – has not turned out to be correct, at least for the trading book.  
Losses in trading books have been several orders of magnitude larger than the capital 
which the models said had to be held against those risks.   
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This does not mean, in my view, scrapping Basel 2.  The general principle of tailoring 
capital requirements to risk remains valid.  What has, however, become apparent, is 
that risks are far greater than previously anticipated, and that capital levels will have 
to reflect the risks that have actually occurred and could occur again.  But we will 
need to change regulation in a manner that avoids unintended consequences and 
avoids creating new opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.   
 
The net effect will, I suspect, almost certainly be a significant increase in capital 
requirements.  At a minimum, revisions to capital requirements will, in my view, have 
to take into account the volatility that we have seen over the past year, so that firms 
would be capable of withstanding extreme events.  It w ould also mean taking into 
account the possible evaporation of market liquidity.  Current proposals for an 
incremental risk charge, including a charge for event risk, on the trading book point in 
my view in the right direction. 
 
In contrast, the so-called “skin in the game” amendment to the Capital Requirements 
Directive may be a step in the wrong direction.  This is a requirement that firms keep 
a certain portion of the asset-backed securities that they underwrite and distribute so 
as to assure that proper due diligence has been exercised throughout the origination 
and distribution chain.  The requirement will certainly add to costs, but it may not 
reduce risk.  Indeed, the gravest problems in this financial crisis have occurred at 
banks, such as UBS, which had not just “skin in the game”, but “limbs on the line” in 
the form of tens of billions of dollars of super-senior exposures. 
 
There will also be a hardening in the quality of capital.  In the current crisis attention 
has increasingly focused on capital that is unequivocally and immediately available to 
bear losses.  I would expect this focus to continue, and for requirements to be 
increasingly framed in terms of Core Tier I capital.  Both the Basel Committee and 
CEBS will be considering these issues. 
 
In particular, I would expect attention to focus on the loss absorbency of capital.  
Common equity unequivocally provides this.  Some forms of hybrid capital do not, in 
the sense that their terms require the bank to undergo some form of reorganisation or 
restructuring before losses can be ascribed to the capital instrument in question.  What 
is needed are instruments that supply capital that can absorb losses whilst the bank is 
a going concern. 
 
Contingent or “top-up” capital may hold significant promise.  Such capital could be 
issued in the form of deeply subordinated debt or preferred stock so that it is junior to 
deposits, but it would be convertible into common stock in the bank upon the bank 
breaching some threshold capital requirement.  Indeed, encouraging or requiring 
banks to raise such capital during booms, rather than returning capital to shareholders 
through share repurchases, may be a suitable form for dynamic provisioning to take.  
It should certainly be easier and cheaper to raise capital for banks during good times 
than in the midst of a crisis, when recourse may need to be made to governments as a 
capital provider of last resort. 
 
Funding liquidity is the next stage in the cycle, and this will certainly receive a great 
deal of attention.  In the  UK we are about to reform liquidity regulation and 
supervision significantly.  The FSA will shortly be issuing a consultation paper to   - 8 - 
introduce a new liquidity regime.  This builds on international work undertaken by the 
Basel Committee and in CEBS.  Under this regime each deposit taking institution will 
be required to undertake an individual assessment of its liquidity risks.  These risks 
include those that could crystallise as a result of a name-specific stress, a market-wide 
stress and a combination of the two.  The regime will also require a bank to manage 
its liquidity risk  – either by managing its assets and liabilities to reduce possible 
liquidity demands or to hold truly liquid assets to offset possible liquidity demands.  
The objective is to minimise the possibility that the institution will require emergency 
liquidity assistance from the central bank, and we anticipate that the new regime, 
coupled with the possibility for banks to issue longer term liabilities under the 
government's credit guarantee programme, will lead to a reduction in reliance on 
overnight funding.   
 
Regulators will also tackle a number of other issues that set the framework in which 
banks operate.  Three are worthy of mention here. 
 
The first is remuneration policies.  Firms themselves have admitted that remuneration 
policies may have been a contributory factor to the financial crisis.  Regulators 
concur.  The Financial Stability Forum will conduct a global survey of firms’ 
remuneration policies and develop appropriate recommendations.  In the UK, the FSA 
has written to the CEOs of major firms to assure that firms' remuneration policies are 
consistent with sound risk management, and we are examining firms’ policies to 
assure that this is the case.   
 
Our concern is not with the level of pay.  We have no objection to people earning high 
compensation, provided they earn it in a manner that is consistent with sound risk 
management.  We do object to remuneration policies that stack the deck in favour of 
the executive.  Such an example might be a bonus system in which the current year 
bonus is based entirely on revenues, not profit, where the executive in question has a 
strong influence over determining revenue recognition, where estimates of future 
profit can be front-loaded into current year revenues, and where the entire bonus is 
paid to the executive immediately in cash.  Such bonus systems can be a one-way 
ticket to disaster, and firms will need to eliminate such practices. 
 
We have followed up the Dear CEO letter by asking major firms to supply us with 
information on their remuneration policies, and we will be meeting them individually 
between now and Christmas to discuss them.  In the New Year, we will give feed 
back to the firms, and hold further discussions where necessary.  We will also publish 
a more general review of remuneration policies in the London market, with a revised 
statement of what we consider to be good practice.   And, we will work closely with 
other regulators and in the Financial Stability Forum to assure that this problem is 
tackled on a global basis. 
 
The second framework issue is strengthening the financial infrastructure.  This 
includes continuing to improve the confirmation, clearing and settlement of credit 
derivatives.  Through concerted effort on the part  of industry and supervisors, 
systemic risk in this market has been significantly reduced, first by the elimination of 
unauthorised assignments, then through the reduction of confirmation backlogs, the 
establishment of a central data warehouse and the automation of trading.  Now 
regulators and industry are working together to establish a central counterparty for   - 9 - 
credit default swaps.   We expect that at least one CCP will be established in the US 
and one in the EU around the end of this year.  The CCP will be structured so as to 
withstand the failure of even the largest of its members/counterparties.  This will 
facilitate a significant reduction in risk. 
 
The third framework issue is a method for prompt resolution of failing banks.  When 
things go wrong at a financial institution, it is important to have in place a process that 
allows the institution in question to be resolved quickly so that consumers are 
protected, assets are liquidated in an orderly manner that respects the rights of 
creditors, and shareholders suffer first loss.  Until 2008 we did not have such a 
framework in the UK, and its absence hindered the resolution of Northern Rock.  The 
Banking Special Provisions Act has been an effective stop gap measure that has 
facilitated the resolution not only of Northern Rock, but also of Bradford and Bingley 
and the UK subsidiaries of failed Icelandic banks, but this Act will expire in February 
2009.  To replace it, the Government introduced on 7 October a Banking Bill that will 
establish a permanent resolution regime for UK banks and building societies and 
greatly strengthen the UK deposit guarantee scheme.  The Banking Reform Bill is 
very much a product of joint work by the three Tripartite authorities and the FSCS as 
well as a reflection of the extensive c onsultation that has been conducted with 
industry and other stakeholders, including the BBA.  The Bill's prompt enactment is 
essential to preserve financial stability.  The EU is now considering measures to 
facilitate prompt resolution and to strengthen deposit guarantee schemes. 
 
This is a massive regulatory and supervisory agenda, and these reforms will 
strengthen the resiliency of the banking system.  But we should be under no illusion 
that on its own regulatory and supervisory reform will be enough to prevent future 
crises.  What central banks do with respect to interest rates, reserve requirements and 
the interest payable on reserves, and liquidity policy (including collateral eligibility, 
haircuts and rates charged for borrowing) has significant effects on financial stability.  
Can these classic central bank tools really be used effectively to puncture asset price 
bubbles before they get out of hand?  If so, financial stability will in my view be much 
enhanced. 
 
But if we are to prevent asset price bubbles from bursting, we must prevent them from 
forming in the first place.  Chairman Greenspan once famously testified that it was 
not the role of the central bank to puncture asset bubbles, but to clean up after they 
had burst.   
 
Surely, in light of current events, we must re-examine that stance.  Indeed, it is just as 
important to ask what causes the cycle that we have depicted here from reversing 
direction from  forward (higher asset prices to greater market liquidity, etc)  to 
backward (lower asset prices to lower market liquidity, etc.), as it is to ask how one 
might dampen the amplitude of the cycle. 
 
The answer, I would suggest, may lie in the realm of monetary policy.  Changing the 
level of interest rates has a powerful, albeit lagged, effect not only o n the real 
economy but also on asset prices.  Driving real interest rates below zero is an 
excellent way to heat up not only the real economy but also asset prices.  And that is 
exactly what the Fed did in 2002 and 2003 following 9/11. 
   - 10 - 
Does monetary policy crank the asset cycle?
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Slamming on the brakes by raising interest rates can have the opposite effect.  And 
that is exactly what the Fed did starting in late 2004.  Real interest rates rose 
dramatically.  By the end of 2006 housing prices in the US had stopped rising, and 
sub-prime borrowers had begun to default on their payments. 
 
A mere coincidence, or cause and effect?  If the former, it makes the regulatory and 
supervisory reforms all the more urgent.  If the latter, is this not an argument for better 
monetary policy as much as for better regulation, and is not better monetary policy as 
much or more part of the cure for crises as better regulation and supervision?    
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